Annex G - Resource Implications - Withers Report

Report of the RMC Board of Governors By the Withers' Study Group
Balanced Excellence Leading Canada's Armed Forces In The New Millenium
4500-240 (ADM (HR-Mil))
24 September 1998

The resource implications of adopting the recommendations of this study may not be very great. To fully appreciate this, one must compare the incremental costs of implementation of the report to:

1. certain other costs which current policy precipitate; and
2. new costs which other impending policy changes will impose on the CF.

First, current systematic problems, both at the College and in the CF, have had a negative impact on retention. Non-retention of excellent people in whom great investment has been made is very expensive. Some of the factors which have been negative for retention are addressed in whole or in part in this report.

Secondly, there are emerging plans of the CF to ensure that all officers recruited in the future have or acquire university degrees. In light of the new degree requirement and the consequent winding down of non-degree officer intake (OCTP), there is a need for a further roughly 125 officers per year, which the department is evidently contemplating acquiring through increasing the civilian university ROTP stream by about 500 (steady state, graduating an additional 125 per annum). This increase would have a substantial direct cost, which we have estimated at $4.18 million per year, exclusive of any fringe benefit costs, physical space costs or salaries of program participants. This would raise non-health-care civilian university ROTP to about 600 (currently 113).

On the other hand, some 530 of such a group could attend the College under the enhanced throughput scheme proposed.

1. They would be able to in terms of available disciplines.
2. They would raise the entering class from about 245 at present to about 380-390, or right where we wanted it to rise to in order to supply about 37% of the officer intake from the College. The remaining officer intake (63%) would be primarily by the DEO route, with the smaller sources contributing as well.

It is likely that the increased class size at RMC could be accommodated for the money not spent on enhancement of civilian university ROTP numbers. Indeed, it seems likely that most of the proposed program enhancements at the College could be paid for out of that amount as well.

Additional expenditures at the College under this plan fall into two categories:

1. accommodating increased numbers; and
2. enhanced quality.

Accommodating increased numbers: the rise from 900 to 1430 (there is some attrition, see transition table on the last page of the main report) officer cadets on site (In this analysis one does not count them during the year when they are on MOC training - see cost note on that below):

1. cost to College of upkeep on quarters: nil (currently full cost recovery, based on what cadets pay)
2. cost of feeding (net): 530 x 889 = $ 471,170
3. extra cost of uniforms: 530 x (est) 500 = $ 265,000
4. extra faculty required: 15 x 70,000 = $1,050,000
5. extra squadron commanders: 5 x 58,278 = $ 291,390
6. extra clerks/admin staff: 6 x 30,000 = $ 180,000
7. extra phys ed costs: est $ 200,000
8. extra bilingualism costs: (see notes) $ 400,000

Total for expansion (direct costs only) = $2,857,560

Enhancements:

• (a) 1 NCM per squadron 14 x 40,000 = $ 560,000
• (b) upgrade squadron commanders 14 x 6,000 = $ 84,000
• (c) upgrade rank of D.Cadets 9,800 = $ 9,800
• (d) increased training budget $ 250,000

Total for these enchancements: = $ 903,800

Total for the increased number and enhancements = $3,761,360 per annum

However, there are some recommendations which impact upon direct operating costs which are not addressed above. A major one which may come into play, with or without either expansion or implementation of the Study Group Report, is pay increases for UTs, which, if brought to similarity with civilian faculty elsewhere might require a further $900,000 per annum. This cannot be addressed here, as it is an issue quite distinct from the changes proposed, but which does ultimately bear on quality.

Notes:

1. Modest increases in faculty numbers are due to very low current class sizes, and the plan not to duplicate fourth year courses.
2. This estimate for the bilingualism costs is due in part to the expectation that the requirement to follow some fourth year classes in the other language, will both replace some SLT and increase the motivation and self-study component of SLT.
3. No account is taken of the savings which result from the fact that the MOC training occurs at a cadet's salary level rather than what would have occurred otherwise with the status quo, under which MOC training would follow graduation and be at full pay of a junior officer. The pay savings during MOC training are here offset against the pay costs of the conditionally commissioned 4^th academic year person at the College. This is actually a net saving for the CF, since for each person going through the system, 16 months of pay moves down from a junior officer's pay to an officer cadet's pay, while 8 months moves up from an officer cadet's pay to a junior officer's pay.

While only direct costs are considered here, the same is true of the civilian ROTP cost comparison. The indirect costs of the existence and scaling up of that program, and the summer training costs contained therein which do not address MOC training are neglected. Detailed costing has not been done, but it is likely that the College is favoured here too.

Retention issues: It will remain for a time a matter of faith that the changes proposed will improve retention at the end of the period of obligatory service. We have interviewed many who have indicated that there will be an effect, and that indeed, in some cases it would have altered their own decisions to leave. It is clear, however, that a handful of additional retentions per year save far more than all expansion and enhancement costs. Thus it is not merely an issue of doing for 3.8 million dollars that which would have cost 4.18 million as a civilian university ROTP program. If retention is altered, these savings of $380,000 per year are the smallest part of the story.

Conclusions:

1. Incremental dollars at RMC go farther than the same number of whole program dollars elsewhere.
2. RMC is under-utilised, and could absorb all of the ROTP scheme except for certain specialised occupations.
3. The DEO program could become more important as well, especially if paying off major sums on student loan debts was an initial inducement. Such a plan would be buying proven success, using to the CF's advantage the buy-out concept so often used against it by employers seeking its trainees/graduates.